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10.1  Introduction 
The not-for-profit sector is responsible for a large amount of economic 
activity that economists have considered to be of primary importance; it 
is estimated to conduct a fifth of research and development (R&D) and 
accounts for almost all production of high-skill human capital outside on- 
the-job training and the vast majority of the health care produced world- 
wide. In the United States, the growing not-for-profit economy employs 
about 10 percent of the labor force.’ About half of the total employment 
in the not-for-profit sector is in health services, concentrated in hospitals, 
of which 85 percent of employment is not-for-profit. Education and re- 
search make up the second largest component of not-for-profit employ- 
ment, about 20 percent, followed by  social services, such as child care 
and job training, which make up about 15 percent of  the not-for-profit 
labor force. 
This importance of the not-for-profit economy in the United States and 
elsewhere has generated a large theoretical and empirical literature on the 
positive behavior and normative role of not-for-profit institutions in eco- 
Tomas Philipson is professor  of  public policy, economics, and law  at the University of 
Chicago, and a research associate of the National Bureau of  Economic Research and the 
Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State. 
This paper has benefited greatly from research assistance by  David Grabowski and Anup 
Malani. The author thanks the volume editor and conference participants, in particular the 
discussants, for input as well as Gary  Becker, Merton Miller, Casey Mulligan, and Derek 
Neal. Financial support from the George Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and 
the State and the Alfred P.  Sloan Foundation Research Fellows Program is gratefully ac- 
knowledged. 
1. See Rudney (1987). 
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nomic activity in general and in health care in particular.* The two major 
strands of this literature attempt to either qualitatively  justify the efficiency 
role of not-for-profit regulations or to draw out and empirically investigate 
behavioral differences between these types of institutions and more tradi- 
tional ones. 
One of the major efficiency rationales put forward for the value of not- 
for-profit production in health care is that it solves an asymmetric infor- 
mation problem between uninformed consumers and informed produc- 
er~.~  The argument is that when quality of supply is unobservable, a pro- 
ducer who is constrained to not have profits has lower agency costs than 
an unconstrained producer. This agency explanation for the efficiency 
gains of not-for-profits is essentially an argument that the output of not- 
for-profit firms is not perfectly substitutable with that of for-profit firms. 
Although the empirical content of this argument, beyond the existence 
of not-for-profits, has not been the focus of previous analysis, this paper 
attempts to test the information asymmetry explanation of not-for-profits. 
Our basic argument is that there should be a not-for-profit premium if this 
asymmetry is important. We  test this implication against the alternative 
prediction that regulatory status is perfectly substitutable on the demand 
side. Consumers do not care about the profit status of the firm per se, only 
indirectly through the price or the observable quality of  its o~tput.~  A 
well-known equilibrium argument is that a necessary condition for two 
perfect substitutes to be sold in equilibrium-that  is, for not-for-profits 
and profits to coexist-is  that they be priced equally. Consumers would 
not hold the more expensive substitute. This implication holds in standard 
hedonic models as well, when consumers may have heterogeneous prefer- 
ences regarding other attributes, as long as all consumers are indifferent 
between organizational forms per se. We apply this simple argument em- 
pirically to the case of the mixed production taking place in the U.S. long- 
term care market. Although the basic argument seems very general, there 
are a few caveats when applying it to the long-term care industry in the 
United States, the main one being supply constraints limiting consumer 
substitutability. 
Testing the difference between the information asymmetry prediction 
and perfect substitutability is operationalized empirically as follows. In a 
cross section of firms, perfect substitutability implies that if  one runs a 
hedonic price regression controlling for the observable qualities of  the 
good, a dummy variable that indicates the not-for-profit status of the pro- 
2. For general discussion see, e.g., Weisbrod (1977, 1987, 1988), Powell (1987), Hansmann 
(1980), Rose-Ackerman (1986, 1996), and the references contained therein. For discussion 
of not-for-profit behavior in health care, see, e.g., Newhouse (1970), Pauly and Redisch 
(1973), Becker and Sloan (1985), and Sloan (1997). Gertler (1989) and Gertler and Waldman 
(1992) address the nursing home industry discussed here. 
3. See, e.g., Weisbrod (1987), Easly and O’Hara (1983), or the review in Hansmann (1987). 
4. Indeed, one may conjecture that most consumers, like most economists, are unable to 
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ducer should have a zero effect. In other words, controlling for observed 
quality, price is not affected by  organizational status. Note that this is a 
necessary condition of equilibrium with mixed production of both organi- 
zational forms. It says that if we observe two nursing homes that offer the 
same observable services, as controlling for quality in a regression  at- 
tempts to do, then they must be priced the same, independent of the status 
of the producer. It is not a sufficient condition of equilibrium, since it may 
be that, as an implication of this perfect substitutability, we  only observe 
the lowest-cost organizational form, as would be the case, for example, 
under  the  common assumption  of  constant returns  to scale in indus- 
trywide cost functions. In contrast, if agency costs were lower in not-for- 
profits, in  a mixed industry in which the two organizational forms were 
equally priced or in which for-profits sold at a premium, complete substi- 
tution toward not-for-profits would be observed. To summarize, in a he- 
donic price regression on quality and organizational form, the informa- 
tional role of not-for-profits would imply a positive independent effect of 
a not-for-profit dummy. 
We attempt to distinguish between these two implications using data on 
the U.S. long-term care industry during the last two decades. The empiri- 
cal analysis is based on pricing behavior as reported in the two latest cross 
sections, 1985 and 1995, of the National Nursing Home Survey (NNHS). 
NNHS is a continuing series of national sample surveys of nursing homes, 
their residents, and their staff. The two years display somewhat different 
results regarding the premia for organizational form. Overall, 1985 pro- 
vides more support for the argument that for-profit care sells at about a 5 
percent premium, as opposed to 1995, which indicates support for the 
perfect substitutability implication of no premium in either direction. The 
results also differ across the types of care offered. In particular, for resi- 
dential care, the premia for for-profit care are the largest and the most 
significant. However, for no year or type of care does the not-for-profit 
premium become significantly positive. Our main finding is therefore that 
if asymmetric information arguments about not-for-profits imply that they 
must sell at a premium in a mixed industry, this evidence does not seem 
to offer support for this implication. 
The paper may be briefly outlined as follows. Section 10.2 briefly dis- 
cusses econometric aspects of the not-for-profit effects of interest, center- 
ing on the particular effect discussed here concerning perfect substitutabil- 
ity. Section 10.3 then summarizes the aggregate trends in quantities and 
prices for the US. nursing home industry by for-profit versus not-for-profit 
status. These aggregates tend to provide the same results as the firm-level 
data. Section 10.4 thereafter considers the perfect substitutability hypoth- 
esis firm-level data on nursing homes using the National Nursing Home 
Survey. Lastly, section 10.5 concludes and discusses the limitations of the 
analysis as well as the potentially exaggerated role attributed to asymmet- 
ric information in shaping market outcomes in health care. 328  Tomas Philipson 
10.2  Types of Not-for-Profit Effects and Perfect Substitutability 
In order to assess the existence of a not-for-profit premium, this section 
first describes the application of the standard potential outcome frame- 
work for the econometric analysis of the impact of not-for-profit status on 
firm behavior. Let (Yo,  Y,)  be two outcome vectors of a single firm, one 
occurring if  that organization were to be a not-for-profit and the other if 
it were to be a for-profit. For example, the outcomes may  represent in- 
put, output, or pricing behavior. The dummy D indicates organizational 
choice. If  the organization chooses to be a not-for-profit firm, then we 
observe the outcome Yo,  and if  it chooses to be a for-profit firm, we  ob- 
serve the outcome Y,. For a given firm, then, we observe 
Y  =  DY, + (1 - D)Y,. 
To discuss conversions over time, let  Y denote such a pair of outcomes at 
a given time and Y’ indicate outcomes at a later time. The central distribu- 
tion of interest is then the joint distribution F( y, y’, d, d’)  over such pairs 
given the choices of organizational form over time. 
As there have been many estimates of not-for-profit effects, it may  be 
useful to make explicit the implicit identifying assumptions that link these 
effects and how they relate to the one of interest in  detecting a not-for- 
profit premium. By  definition of potential outcomes, we  only observe the 
distributions F(y,lD  = d)  in the first period  and F(y,’ID  = d‘) in the 
second period. However, many effects in which we  are interested involve 
knowing the counterfactual distributions F( y,lD  # d)  in the first period 
and F(y,‘JD’  # d’)  in the second. The missing data, by definition, is the 
behavior of the firms if they were not in their observed regulatory status. 
For example, we  would not be able to observe the uncompensated care or 
debt level of a not-for-profit firm if the same firm was for-profit. 
One may therefore distinguish between observed and potential effects of 
regulatory choice. Observed effects concern differences in behavior across 
firms in the regulatory status they have actually chosen, and potential 
effects concern differences between observed and counterfactual statuses. 
The first type of  effect is key  when testing positive theories of not-for- 
profit or for-profit choice as done in this paper; it focuses on how firms do 
behave in the data. The second type of effect focuses on how firms would 
behave under  some other circumstances not  observed in the data; it is 
therefore often key  for evaluating new policy interventions, such as, for 
example, the effect of raised corporate income taxes on  conversion^.^ 
5. Observed versus potential effects have little to do with whether the analysis is cross- 
sectional across firms or longitudinal effects involving conversions of the same firm. Observ- 
able cross-sectional effects are concerned with comparing the outcomes of not-for-profits 
with for-profits, F(y,ld  = 1) with F(y,ld = l), as opposed to potential  effects that require 
data, F(y,,  yold = 1) if looking at for-profits and F(y,,  y,ld = 1) when looking at not-for- 
profits. Likewise, observable longitudinal effects would compare F(y#  = 0) with F(y;ld‘ = Asymmetric Information and the Not-for-Profit  Sector  329 
Observed effects concern the properties of the equilibrium of firm be- 
havior under regulations observed in the data. The observed effect of in- 
terest here concerns whether similar output in a mixed industry sells at a 
not-for-profit premium. A well-known argument in economics suggests 
that a necessary condition for two perfect substitutes to be sold in equilib- 
rium is that they are priced equally. If they were  not, consumers would 
not hold the more expensive substitute. Below, we  will apply this simple 
argument to the case of the impact of organizational form in  the mixed 
U.S. long-term care market. We  operationalize this argument in a cross 
section of producers as follows. It implies that if  one runs a price regres- 
sion controlling for the observable aspects of the good affecting its value 
to the consumer, such as quality of  services of homes, a not-for-profit 
dummy should have a zero effect. In other words, controlling for quality, 
price is not affected by organizational status6  Note that this is a necessary 
condition of equilibrium in the mixed long-term care market. It says that 
if we find two homes that offer the same services, as controlling for quality 
in a regression attempts to do, then they must be priced the same, indepen- 
dent of the status of the producer. It is not sufficient, since it may be that 
as  an implication of  this perfect  substitutability, we  only  observe the 
lowest-cost organizational form. It is completely due to the demand side, 
as all it requires is that if two goods that are perfectly substitutable are to 
be held in equilibrium, they must be equally priced for demanders to hold 
them both. 
It is well known that, generally, hedonic regressions do not identify de- 
mand schedules when both sides are heterogeneous; only when demand is 
homogeneous does the price function trace it out. However, here the argu- 
ment is that although the demand side may be heterogeneous with respect 
to other quality attributes, under the null it is homogeneous with respect 
to organizational form; all consumers are perfectly willing to substitute 
the two given that the observable quality of the service is held constant. 
Consumers may value different types of services offered by nursing homes 
differently, although they all would be indifferent between a not-for-profit 
and for-profit home if they offered the same services. Although producers 
of different types may sort themselves due to differences in comparative 
advantages of care, when a not-for-profit firm and a for-profit firm end up 
providing the same service, they must do it at the same price because the 
hedonic equilibrium price function traces out the homogeneous indiffer- 
ence to organizational form. 
1) when looking at not-for-profit conversions and F(y,ld = 1) with F(yJd' = 0) when looking 
at for-profit conversions. Potential longitudinal  effects would concern how representative 
conversions were to changes in status of nonconverters. 
6. Under perfect substitutability and equal prices, profit differences are only due to cost 
differences, which may be substantial given the difference in input markets between the two 
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Lack of a not-for-profit premium is a cross-sectional independence re- 
striction on outcome distributions across regulatory statuses. It says that 
price is independently distributed across regulatory status conditional on 
quality observable to consumers. Letting the outcome vector  Y = (p,q) 
discussed above represent price and quality, a weaker version of  it only 
requires means, as opposed to the entire distributions, to be the same, as in 
E[p,lq, =  q,d =  11  =  E[p,Iq,  =  q,d =  01. 
This cross-sectional observed effect does not claim to take a stand on what 
the potential effect is or what the longitudinal observed or potential effect 
is. In particular, longitudinal estimators that attempted to correct for “un- 
observed  heterogeneity” would  be  particularly  bad  for  addressing this 
equilibrium restriction. 
The perfect substitutability implication differs from the not-for-profit 
premium implication due to asymmetry of information between demand- 
ers and suppliers. According to this argument, consumers are assumed to 
know the IRS status of the producer, but not to be able to know the full 
quality, both observed and unobserved, leading to an inequality replacing 
the equality above. 
E[p,Iq, =  q,d =  11  <  E[p,Iq,  =  q,d =  01. 
A priori, it seems that one would suspect that consumers knew more about 
the quality of output than the regulatory status of the firm. Nevertheless, 
a necessary equilibrium condition of a mixed industry would be that not- 
for-profits would then have to sell at a premium, since if  they did not, 
output by for-profit firms would not be held. 
10.3  Aggregate Trends in the U.S. Long-Term Care Industry 
As background to the firm-level  discussion of not-for-profit premia in the 
sale of long-term care to follow, this section first discusses the aggregate 
differences between the behavior of firms of different regulatory statuses. 
Figure 10.1 shows the percentage trends in market structure and firm 
size during the last three decades. More precisely, it depicts the number of 
nursing homes, the average size of firms in terms of beds, and capacity in 
terms of occupancy rate. 
According to these data, the total number of  nursing homes in the 
United States increased during the mid-l970s, was fairly level during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, and then decreased in the late 1980s and into 
the  1990s. However, the percentage differences in number of firms are 
rather small compared with the normalized value at year 1973. Occupancy 
rates have basically remained unchanged at very high levels,  around 95 
percent. However, the average firm size, beds per nursing home, has been Asymmetric Information and the Not-for-Profit Sector  331 
160  I  1 
Year 
Fig. 10.1 
and occupancy rates, 1973-95 
Source: The data in this figure were constructed from several sources, including HCIA, the 
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), and annual censuses. 
Note: The three trends above are all normalized to 100 in 1973. The actual values in 1973 
are 16,700 for nursing homes, 75 for beds, and 91.4 percent for occupancy rates. 
Relative growth of number of nursing homes, beds per nursing home, 
steadily increasing since 1973, with homes being about 40 percent larger 
now than in 1973. These three trends imply that output growth has mainly 
occurred through expanded firm size and not through expanded entry or 
capacity. 
We  first report aggregate state data on the observed premia and other 
differences between organizational forms. We use data from HCIA as re- 
ported for the years 1988-94  in the issues of the Guide to the Nursing Home 
Industry. This data set contains summary statistics for the universe of nurs- 
ing homes in the United States that receive any reimbursement from Med- 
icaid and Medicare, which is  about 80 percent  of  the total universe of 
about 18,000 homes. 
Table 10.1 shows the national evidence of the differences in output, in- 
put, and prices between for-profits versus not-for-profits as measured by 
the HCIA survey of homes. 
The table reports both the absolute values as well as the relative values 
between the two groups. For example, it indicates that for-profits had, on 
average, 14 percent more beds in a home than not-for-profits in 1989. Con- 
sistent with other studies showing lower costs of for-profits relative to not- 
for-profits, the table reports lower staffing ratios and wages  but a larger 
quantity of output as measured by patient days. For-profits use 87-91  per- 
cent of  the full-time equivalents (FTEs) of not-for-profits, pay them 93 
percent of not-for-profit wages, but take care of 11-13  percent more pa- 
tient days. Since labor by  far dominates the cost of production, on this 
high level of  aggregation and not adjusting for quality and the type of 
patient populations for which these homes cared, for-profit homes are sug- 
gested to be lower cost. Despite these cost differences, and of relevance to 
our later analysis of pricing behavior, this aggregate data displays apremium Table 10.1  National Quantity and Price Data by Year and Type of Nursing Home, 1989-1994 
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
FP  NFP  Ratio  FP  NFP  Ratio  t.P  NFP  Ratio  FP  NFP  Ratio  FP  NFP  Ratio  FP  NFP  Ratio 
Outputs 
Patient davs  34.565.5  30.754.9  1.12  34.518.05  31,355.32  11 
Size (number of 
beds) 
Capacity 
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Wages  15,628  16,818  .93  17,321  18,626  .93  18,606 
Source: National Nursing Home Survey, 1989-1994. 
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96.71  .98 
.89  .9 
.31  1.74 
13.42  .62 
2.92  2 23 
71.54  1.02 
19,335  .96  20,133  20,615  .98 
14.818.99  31.040.77  1.12 
88  1.15 
9445  96.64  .98 
101 
.83  .91  .91 
.51  .32  1.59 
8.64  13.4  .64 
6.67  3.29  2.03 
14.306.35  30,453.04  1.13 
1  00  87  1  15 
93.99  95.9  .98 
.84  .92  .91 
56  .26  2.15 
8.96  14.07  64 
6.96  3.63  1.92 
71.66  70 I4  1.02 
21,801  22,162  98 
- 
Wore  FP represents for-profit, and NFP not-for-profit, nursing homes. Ratio indicates the for-profit divided by the not-for-profit values Asymmetric Information and the Not-for-Profit Sector  333 
for for-profit care. At this level of aggregation, private prices are higher, 
not lower, for care in for-profit homes relative to not-for-profit homes. 
Since the regulation and subsidization of this industry varies greatly 
across states, as Medicaid is administrated and partly funded by the states, 
it is  useful to consider the aggregate state evidence regarding the differ- 
ences between for-profit and not-for-profit care within states. Table 10.2 
shows the aggregate state-level evidence on the differences between for- 
profits versus not-for-profits corresponding to the national  evidence in 
table 10.1. Using a state as the unit of observation, it reports the distribu- 
tion across states of  the relative ratio of the measured variables. If this 
average is  unity without  any variance, then this means that, across all 
states, the two forms of organization have identical outcomes. The larger 
the variance and the further away this mean is from unity, the less alike 
the two forms are across states. 
This unconditional data on the distribution of differences in averages 
across states shows that they are less pronounced than the national differ- 
ences, so that part of the national differences is the result of aggregation 
bias with respect to heterogeneous states. Within a state, the two sectors 
appear to be more similar. For  example, although for the nation  as a 
whole, for-profits are about 14 percent larger in bed size, on average, they 
are 10 percent larger within a state. Although by definition, average public 
prices do not vary across organizational form within a state, the private 
prices are remarkably similar within  states. This similarity does not of 
course control for any quality characteristics or other factors that may 
drive price, but it suggests that even on this broad level of  aggregation, 
output tends to be priced similarly, as would be suggested by the perfect 
substitution hypotheses.’ 
10.4  Firm Level Analysis of the Not-for-Profit Premium 
These aggregate data are only suggestive of the differences in behavior 
across firms of different organizational forms. In this section, we  go on to 
consider the substitution hypothesis versus information hypothesis using 
firm-level data on prices from the two latest cross sections, 1985 and 1995, 
of the National Nursing Home Survey (NNHS). NNHS is  a continuing 
series of national sample surveys of nursing homes, their residents, and 
their staff. Four nursing home surveys have been conducted: 1973, 1977, 
1985, and 1995.8Although  each of these surveys emphasized different top- 
7. The observed effects were upper bounds on the counterfactual effects under the theory 
of choice of organizational form discussed in Lakdawalla and Philipson (1997). The ratio 
above therefore represents upper bounds of the differences given this level of aggregation; 
actual potential effects would be smaller than in the table under the theory. 
8. These surveys were preceded by  a series of surveys from 1963 through 1969 called the 
“resident places” surveys. Table 10.2  Distribution of State Differences in Aggregate Quantities and Prices by Year and Type of Nursing Home, 1989-1994 
- 
1989  I990  1991  1992  1993  I994 
Mean  SD  Min  Max  Mean  SD  Min  Max  Mean  SD  Min  Max  Mean  SD  Min  Max  Mean  SD  Mm  MdX  Mean  SD  Mm  Max 
Output 
Patient days  1 08  29 
Size (number of 
Capacity (occupancy 
beds)  1.1  .3 




equivalents  .85  .09 
Capital 
Long-term debt 
to total assets  1.49  .92 
Age ofplants  .6  .23 
Depreciation  1.56  .55 
Prices 
Outputs 
Private price per 
Public price per 
YO  publicly priced 
day  .Y7  .24 
day  10 
days  1.13  .I8 
InDUtS 
.5  1.92  1.06  .26 
.53  1.9  1.09  .27 
.Yl  1.03  .98  .03 
.6l  1.04  .87  .I 
.05  4  1.54  .98 
.I9  1.14  .66  .22 
.69  3.39  1.47  .59 
.33  1.37  1  .69 
1110 
.9  1.58  1-16  .2 
Wages  .97  09  .73  1.38  .97  .09 
Source:  National Nursing Home Survey, 1989-1994. 
.51  1.76  1.06  .25 
53  1.84  1.08  26 
.91  1.01  .98  .03 
.&1  1.06  .86  .II 
.25  4.1  1.55  1.2 
.26  1.19  .72  .25 
.I5  3.32  1.44  .45 
.I3  4.62  .88  .28 
Ill0 
.94  1.84  1.15  .I6 
.69  1.17  .9Y  12 
5  1.82  1.05  .28 
.53  1.84  1.07  .3 
.91  1.03  .98  .02 
.56  1.08  .9  .08 
.I3  5.57  1.46  .6 
.28  1.24  .76  19 
.65  2.5  1.37  34 
.I6  1.28  .96  .23 
Ill0 
.93  1.54  1.12  .I4 
.73  1.52  I  .05 
.75  2.24  1.05  .27 
.76  2.42  1.06  .28 
.93  1.04  .99  .02 
.72  1.04  .91  .08 
.55  3.25  1.47  .XI 
.35  1 18  .77  .I6 
81  2.21  I33  .36 
.35  1.45  1.04  .2 
Ill0 
.97  1.56  1.11  .I2 
.9  1.1  .Y9  .04 
.75  2.21  1.05  .27  .74  2.19 
.76  2.3  1.06  .2R  .75  2.3 
.94  1.04  .99  .03  .94  1.04 
.73  1.06  .92  .07  .75  1.03 
.46  4.4  1.33  .53  .28  2.68 
.4  1.09  .77  .I5  .54  1.07 
.89  2.26  1.22  .29  .77  2 
.61  1.41 
II 
.98  1.53  1.09  .I  .98  1.47 
.89  I  1  .99  .03  .9  1.05 
- 
Note: Summary statistics refer to the for-profit divided by the not-for-profit  variable values Asymmetric Information and the Not-for-Profit Sector  335 
ics,  they  all provided  some common  basic information  about  nursing 
homes, their residents, and their staff. For our purposes in investigating 
pricing, we  only utilize the  1985 and  1995 cross sections because those 
were the only ones that contained prices. The survey is that of repeated 
cross sections and thus does not allow for longitudinal comparison. How- 
ever,  the  pricing  implication  of  interest  concerns  the  observed cross- 
sectional equilibrium distribution  at a particular  point  in  time. It asks 
whether, at a given time, similar outputs sell at different or the same prices 
dependent on organizational status. Therefore, it does not put clear re- 
strictions on the longitudinal data in terms of changes in prices over sev- 
eral periods. Therefore, the fact that NNHS is not a panel survey is not of 
primary importance for the question addressed here. 
The frame of the NNHS includes all nursing and related care homes in 
the United States. Places that only provide room and board are excluded, 
as are places with fewer than three beds. All  nursing home facilities in- 
cluded in the survey are freestanding or are nursing care units of hospitals, 
retirement centers, or similar institutions where the unit maintains finan- 
cial and resident records separate from those of the larger institution. The 
two earlier surveys, conducted in 1985 and in 1977, are similar because 
they both included nursing care homes, personal care homes, and domicil- 
iary care homes. These surveys represent a broadening in scope over that 
of the 1973-74  survey, which excluded facilities providing only personal 
care or domiciliary care. However, because personal and domiciliary care 
homes constitute such a small proportion of the 1977 and 1985 surveys, no 
special adjustments need to be made when comparing the three surveys. 
The data were  sampled using a stratified two-stage probability design. 
The first stage was a selection of facilities, and the second stage was a 
selection of residents and employees of the sampled facilities. In the 1985 
survey, only registered nurses were sampled. The sampling frame for em- 
ployees was the list of all staff members, including those employed by con- 
tract. Only staff members involved in direct patient care (administrative, 
medical, therapeutic, and nursing staff) were sampled. Survey data were 
collected using a combination of personal interview and self-enumerated 
forms. 
The summary statistics of the data for the two cross sections 1985 and 
1995 of  the NNHS are contained in tables 10.3 and 10.4. As before, for 
each year, the data are reported by the tax status of the home. 
Similar to the aggregate data discussed before, these summary statistics 
are grouped into categories of output and input, along with their corre- 
sponding prices. The variable that divides up the data in each cross section 
is a for-profit dummy that indicates the tax status of the home. Due to the 
different designs of the survey, the  1985 categorization of not-for-profit 
includes only private firms but the 1995 categorization contains both pub- 
lic and private firms. The 1985 data are generally better suited than the 
1995  data  for  investigating  our  question  concerning  price  differences Table 10.3  Summary Statistics of Nursing Homes by Ownership Status, NNHS 1985 
For-Profit  Not-for-Profit 
(N  = 752y  (N = 336) 
Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Control variables 
Hospital-owned homeb 
Member of group of homesb 
Quantity-patient days 























Northeast region of U.S.b 
North central region of U.S. 
South region of U.S.b 
West region of U.S.b 
Public Medicaid price per day 
Input variables 







Number of nurses 

















































































































"Note that missing observations will decrease the sample size for certain variables summarized below. 
bVariable  is a dummy, with Yes  = 1 and No = 0. 
'This is a quality index that represents the fraction of 18 measured services the nursing homes provide. 
These measured services are medical, other medical, nursing, mental health, physical therapy, speech 
or hearing therapy, occupational therapy, special education, personal care, social services, nutrition, 
hospice, sheltered employment, vocational rehabilitation, transportation, prescriptiodnon-prescription 
medications, equipmenUdevices, and any other resident services. Note that specifying these services as 
separate dummy variables did not significantly alter the findings. Table 10.4  Summary Statistics of Nursing Homes for 1995 National Nursing Home Survey by 
Ownership Status, NNHS 1995 
For-Profit  Not-for-Profit 
(N  = 924p  (N = 485) 
Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Control variables 
Member of group of homesb 
Output variables 
Scale-number  of beds 
Admissions 
Output prices 




Public Medicaid price per day 
Public Medicare price per day 
Certifiedb 
Percent of measured resident services 
Located in cityb 
FTEs: Administrators 
FTEs: Registered nurses 
FTEs: Licensed practicing nurses 
FTEs: Nurses' aides 
FTEs: Doctors 
FTEs: Dentists 
FTEs: Dental hygienists 




































































































"Note that missing observations will decrease the sample size for certain variables summarized below. 
bVariable  is a dummy, with Yes = 1 and No = 0. 
<This  is a quality index that represents the fraction of 20 measured resident services the nursing homes 
provide. These measured services are dental, help with oral hygiene, home health, hospice, medical, 
mental health, nursing, nutrition, occupational therapy, personal care, physical therapy, podiatry, pre- 
scriptiodnon-prescription  medications,  sheltered  employment,  social  services,  special  education, 
speech or hearing therapy, transportation, vocational rehabilitation, and equipmenddevices. Note that 
specifying these services as separate dummy variables did not significantly alter the findings. 
dAn FTE is a full-time equivalent employee. 338  Tomas Philipson 
across similar services; they contain more detailed categorization of prices 
as well  as better controls on the cost of production in the homes. 
There are three levels of service provided  by  a nursing home in these 
data, and both private  and public  pricing  differentiates  between  them. 
These three levels are skilled, intermediary, and residential, ranging from 
the most to the least acute care offered, and hence from the most expensive 
to the least expensive. In 1995, the market is divided roughly in half be- 
tween skilled and intermediate care, 46 versus 50 percent of consumers, 
with residential care making up the remaining 4 percent.’  Although the 
type of services differs across these three levels of care, in the 1995 NHHS, 
the fraction of residents within an average home using particular services 
were as follows: 17 percent for dental care, 88 percent for medical services, 
14 percent for mental health services, 96 percent for nursing services, 69 
percent for nutritional services,  14 percent for occupational therapy, 25 
percent for physical therapy, 93 percent for prescribed and nonprescribed 
medication, 64 percent for social services, 7 percent for speech and hear- 
ing therapy, 22 percent for transportation services, and 8 percent for other 
types of services not documented. 
There is a large share of consumers that are publicly subsidized by the 
Medicaid  program  for the poor and the Medicare program for the old. 
Medicare  subsidies are not means  tested  and are only  for about three 
months of more acute skilled nursing care after hospitalization; this repre- 
sents a very small fraction of total days, in terms of a few percent. Medic- 
aid subsidies are means tested but are for both skilled and intermediary 
care; this represents a very large fraction of total days-often  more than 
two-thirds. Furthermore, states differ substantially in how they spend and 
regulate the nursing home industry through Medicaid. The main impact 
of this is through the daily price they pay for subsidized consumers-the 
per diem prices of skilled or intermediary Medicaid patients. 
Since prices reflect the cost of production  of the quality of care pro- 
vided, it is important to control for quality when assessing price differ- 
ences across organizational  form for similar services. The two waves of 
the NNHS contained rather detailed measures of quality, both in terms of 
the type of labor employed  (accounting for about 90 percent of overall 
production  costs)  as well  as the services provided  to consumers  in the 
home. About 20 different types of services were measured in both years, 
and we  created an index representing the fraction of these measured ser- 
vices that were provided within a home. 
Tables 10.5 and 10.6 consider cross-sectional price differences for simi- 
lar outputs for the years 1985 and 1995. The equilibrium effect of organi- 
zational form is estimated controlling for service offered in terms of the 
type of consumer population served, labor inputs, size and quality of insti- 
9. See National Center for Health Statistics (1997). Asymmetric Information and the Not-for-Profit Sector  339 
Table 10.5  Perfect Substitution Tests, NNHS 1985 
Public  output, 
Price  Control  Input  Quality 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent  Variable: Private Price Per Day--Skilled 
For-profit  0.03  0.05  0.07  0.06 
(1.73)  (2.19)  (3.10)  (3.13) 
Sample size  487  413  413  413 
R2  0.53  0.54  0.58  0.62 
For-profit  .05  .05  .07  .07 
Sample size  478  405  405  405 
R2  0.43  0.49  0.53  0.60 
Dependent  Vuriable: Private Price Per Day-intermediate 
(1.73)  (2.42)  3.50)  (3.58) 
Dependent  Variable: Private Price Per Day-Residential 
For-profit  0.26  0.20  0.26  0.27 
(4.64)  (2.73)  (3.46)  (3.58) 
Sample size  154  132  132  132 
R2  0.19  0.32  0.38  0.42 
~ 
?Vole: The specifications (1-4)  correspond to the blocks of variables found in the summary 
statistics in tdbk 10.3. Each subsequent specification includes all those variables included in 
the previous specifications (e.g., specification 2 includes both the outputkontrol variables 
and public prices). Coefficient estimates of the for-profit variable (1 = for-profit, 0 = not- 
for-profit) are reported with t-statistics in parentheses below them. All price variables (both 
public and private) are logged in these regressions. 
tution, as well as other variables that may determine the value of the prod- 
uct to consumers. The tables report four specifications with successively 
larger and inclusive conditioning sets. These conditioning sets correspond 
to the sets reported in the summary statistics in tables 10.3 and 10.4. 
The key effect of interest for the perfect substitution or asymmetric in- 
formation hypothesis is that of the for-profit dummy that indicates how 
price changes with the tax  status, controlling for quality of care. Only 
these price effects of organizational form are reported across the four spec- 
ifications.I0  This effect concerns the observed effect of the equilibrium dis- 
tribution of homes choosing their actual status; it has little to say about 
the potential effects when the equilibrium would change under alternative 
incentives than those prevailing when the data was collected. 
The two years display somewhat different results regarding the premia 
for for-profit care. Overall, 1985 provides more support to the argument 
that for-profit care sells at about a 5 percent premium, as opposed to 1995, 
which indicates support for the perfect substitutability implication of no 
premium in either direction. The results also differ across the types of care 
10. The entire tables are available from the author upon request. 340  Tomas Philipson 
Table 10.6  Perfect Substitution Tests, NNHS 1995 
~~ 
Public  output, 
Price  Control  Input  Quality 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Variable: Private Price Per Day-Skilled 
For-profit  -0.02  0.01  0.04 
Sample size  912  834  82  1 
R'  0.40  0.40  0.43 
(-0.70)  (2.562)  (1.8) 
Dependent Variable: Private Price Per Day-Intermediate 
For-profit  -0.004  0.008  0.03 
(-0.18)  (0.37)  (1.14) 
R'  0.40  0.43  0.46 
Sample size  623  568  557 
Dependent Variable: Private Price Per Day-Residential 
For-profit  0.16  0.14  0.17 
(2.32)  (1  30)  (2.06) 
Sample size  217  198  195 













Note: The specifications (1-4)  correspond to the blocks of variables found in the summary 
statistics in table 10.4. Each subsequent specification includes all those variables included in 
the previous specifications (e.g., specification 2 includes both the outputlcontrol variables 
and public prices). Coefficient estimates of the for-profit variable (1 = for-profit, 0 = not- 
for-profit) are reported with t-statistics in parentheses below them. All price variables (both 
public and private) are logged in these regressions. 
offered. In particular,  for residential care, the premia for for-profit care 
are the largest and the most significant. The asymmetric information argu- 
ment would seem to imply that not-for-profit output should sell at a pre- 
mium relative to for-profit output when they are both demanded in a com- 
petitive economy. However, for neither year and neither type of the three 
types of care offered does the premium for for-profit care become signifi- 
cantly negative. 
These results have several obvious limitations and should therefore be 
viewed as suggestive, and not conclusive, in demonstrating the empirical 
relevance of perfect substitutability of organizational form. The first limi- 
tation is the lack of quality controls available in the data, particularly in 
terms of not being able to assign geographical locators of homes in great 
detail. Second, it is well  known that there are barriers to entry in U.S. 
health care markets, particularly  in long-term care, where certificate of 
need (CON) laws seem to have had a great impact and are often monitored 
and enforced with respect to measures such as beds per old individual 
in the region.  I  Noncompetitive markets may have less substitution than 
assumed throughout the discussion here, as public regulations may inflate 
11. See Lakdawalla and Philipson (1997) who uses the differences in the restrictiveness in 
CON laws to explain not-for-profit shares across states. Asymmetric Information and the Not-for-Profit Sector  341 
for-profit premia. Without such regulatory barriers that may  allow for- 
profits to mark up more aggressively, both perfect substitutability  or infor- 
mation asymmetry would imply that if for-profits mark up more, then full 
substitution toward the equally or more preferred output of not-for-profits 
should take place in the long run. 
To address these concerns to the largest degree feasibly allowed by these 
data, although not by  any means ideally, table 10.7 reports the estimated 
premia by region and interacts them with city versus rural location within 
those regions. The table indicates that the premia are of similar order, 
although efficiency is reduced and the coefficients are freed up to vary 
across regions. 
Many observers of health care and other regionally based markets tend 
to believe that regional market power is less pronounced in city markets; 
that is, city markets are more competitive than rural markets. Therefore, 
if competition lowers the for-profit premium because market power is less 
pronounced, one would expect the for-profit premium to be lower in the 
city markets than in rural markets. However, the city interaction in column 
5 of table 10.7 seems to indicate that the for-profit premium is higher in 
the more competitive city markets, especially in intermediary care. The 
raw or unconditional interaction, the second specification within each re- 
gion, has a negative but most often insignificant effect. However, when 
controlling for quality as done before, the interaction is either insignifi- 
cantly different from zero or significantly positive. At this level of aggre- 
gation, this raises questions about whether less-restrictive entry barriers 
would eliminate the for-profit premium. 
10.5  Concluding Discussion 
A necessary condition of equilibrium with mixed production under the 
asymmetric information rationale for  not-for-profit production is  that 
their output sells at a premium. However, we  found that data from the 
National Nursing Home Survey in 1995 seem to support perfect substitut- 
ability and that data from 1985 even indicate the existence of a for-projt 
premium. The empirical analysis here was naturally tentative and illustra- 
tive. In addition, the U.S. long-term care industry has potential barriers 
to entry in some states, making the free entry assumption required for 
price equalization difficult. However, we  hope the main message of the 
exercise is clear: Theoretical arguments about not-for-profit production, 
in particular the role of asymmetric information, need to be confronted 
with supporting data before acquiring their current level of acceptance. 
More generally, it may be that asymmetric information plays a less im- 
portant role in determining outcomes in health care markets than is often 
argued by economists (see Arrow 1963). Indeed, for mortality-inducing or 
chronic health conditions, it is difficult to think of any other goods or 
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.62 
Note: The specifications (1-4)  correspond to the blocks of variables found in table 10.3 (with the exception that the region dummies in specification 4 have 
been omitted). Each subsequent specification includes all those variables included in the previous specifications (e.g., specification 2 includes both  the 
outputkontrol variables and public prices). Specification 5 is identical to specification 4 except that it includes an interaction term (FP*City). Coefficient 
estimates of  the for-profit variable (1 = for-profit, 0 = not-for-profit) are reported with t-statistics in parentheses below them. All price variables (both 
public and private) are logged in these regressions. 344  Tomas Philipson 
tives.  Chronic illness allows time to learn and, as a consequence, the 
level  of  information among  chronically ill  about  available  treatments 
is astounding. It is not uncommon that it is at least on par with that of 
doctors not specializing in the disease. The growth in disease-specific web 
pages and electronic support groups will only spur this knowledge. Al- 
though  foreign  to  the  working  assumptions of  economists analyzing 
health care markets, this is not surprising, since when decisions are impor- 
tant, people will inform themselves about their consequences. In the face 
of these strong incentives for acquiring information by the demand side, 
tracing out the empirical content of the proposed impacts of asymmetric 
information in health care markets seems important, particularly since the 
conviction of economists of their importance often is based on theoretical 
citations rather than on the facts those citations help explain.I2 
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Comment on Chapters 9 and 10  Judith K. Hellerstein 
Introduction 
The two papers I discuss here, “The Tax Benefits of Not-for-Profit Hos- 
pitals” by Gentry and Penrod (hereafter GP), and “Asymmetric Informa- 
tion and the Not-for-Profit Sector: Does Its Output Sell at a Premium?” 
by Philipson, seem at first glance to have little in common other than that 
they both examine aspects of organizational form (for-profit versus not-for- 
profit) within health care. Upon closer inspection, however, there are many 
interesting features of the papers that are similar, from their attention to 
detail in discussing the institutions they study to the similar implications 
that can be drawn from both papers about the effects of  organizational 
form in health care, implications that are not the focus of either paper. 
The remainder of my  discussion will  consist of  four sections. In the 
next section, I discuss how the two seemingly disparate papers are actually 
similar in many ways, and how together they bring to light some important 
implications about organizational form in health care. In the third section, 
I comment briefly on GP alone, while in the fourth section I comment 
briefly on Philipson. The fifth section concludes. 
Linking the Papers 
While both the GP and Philipson papers consider aspects of organiza- 
tional form in health care markets, they seek to answer completely differ- 
Judith K. Hellerstein is assistant professor of economics at the University of  Maryland 
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ent questions in very different markets within health care. GP examines 
the implications  of the tax benefits of not-for-profit hospitals in the United 
States, and provides ceteris paribus benchmark estimates of the dollar 
value of the benefits to not-for-profit hospitals of the various aspects of 
their tax exemption. Philipson, on the other hand, examines empirically 
whether consumers are willing to pay a premium for not-for-profit care in 
nursing homes, which is what agency theories of the benefits of not-for- 
profits suggest. 
Moreover, even though both papers are concerned with aspects of or- 
ganizational form (for-profit versus not-for-profit)  in health care, the mar- 
kets they examine are different. Nursing homes can be thought of as pro- 
viding long-term health care for the elderly, and short-term general hos- 
pitals (those considered by GP) can be thought of as providing short-term 
health care for the general population. Importantly, as Philipson notes, 
there is a fundamental difference between them in the United States: Hos- 
pitals are primarily not-for-profit, while in nursing homes, the for-profit 
organization predominates. 
One might expect, then, that the two papers would have little in com- 
mon. And yet there are striking similarities between them. The first simi- 
larity is stylistic, but it bears mentioning because it is quite important. The 
two sets of authors both pay careful attention to the important details of 
the institutions they study. GP, in considering the magnitudes and implica- 
tions of the tax benefits of not-for-profit hospitals, explain clearly the tax 
implications of  not-for-profit status. They also document in great detail 
similarities and differences in the structures of not-for-profit versus for- 
profit hospitals, including tabulations across organizational forms of in- 
puts and outputs (facility beds, employees, length of stay, assets, patient 
composition, available technologies, etc.) and financial information, in- 
cluding measures of  profitability. Philipson, in  focusing on  long-term 
health care facilities, also documents in detail differences across organiza- 
tional form in inputs and outputs such as facility beds, types of employees, 
and types of services offered. Both papers therefore serve useful purposes 
as references for readers interested in learning more about the economics 
of organizational form in short-term and long-term care in the United 
States, and may help inspire future research about these markets. 
GP identify the three common justifications for the existence of not-for- 
profits. Perhaps the most compelling justification, at least from an eco- 
nomic standpoint, is that there are information asymmetries in the provi- 
sion of health care. Since consumers of health care cannot fully evaluate 
the quality of  the services they are purchasing, for-profits will have an 
incentive to both underprovide quality and overprovide quantity, as both 
of these can increase profits. The existence of not-for-profits, then, helps 
solve this agency problem. It is this justification for not-for-profits that 
forms the basis for the Philipson paper. If consumers cannot, in fact, fully Comment on Chapters 9 and 10  347 
evaluate the quality of health care they are receiving, they should be will- 
ing, in theory, to pay for the elimination of this agency problem. In other 
words, consumers should be willing to pay a premium for the services of 
a not-for-profit provider, and Philipson provides an empirical test of this 
hypothesis in nursing homes. 
While not-for-profits do enjoy tax benefits because of their organiza- 
tional form, GP point out that they may be disadvantaged in two ways. 
First, they may have a harder time accessing capital than for-profits be- 
cause they cannot issue equity, and second, they may not enjoy the mana- 
gerial efficiency that for-profits enjoy because of principal-agent problems. 
In fact, both papers provide evidence that is at least consistent with both 
of these issues. 
GP  provide ample evidence that for various sensible measures of capital 
intensity (or its inverse), for-profit hospitals are more capital intensive 
than not-for-profit hospitals. This is shown most convincingly in the de- 
scriptive multivariate regression results in table 9.5, where for-profits have 
significantly  lower  employee-to-bed ratios  in  addition  to  significantly 
higher ratios of fixed assets to net patient revenues, fixed assets per dis- 
charge, and capital costs over total costs. Philipson only provides sum- 
mary statistics of characteristics of not-for-profit and for-profit nursing 
homes and provides no statistical tests for differences between the two, so 
it is slightly harder to tell whether capital intensity really varies statistically 
across organizational form. Nonetheless, from the statistics he does pres- 
ent in table 10.1, which are derived from national data for 1989-1994,  for- 
profits have higher bed sizes but fewer employees, so that the employee- 
to-bed-size ratio is smaller in for-profit than not-for-profit nursing homes. 
In addition, for-profits also pay lower wages and therefore have much 
higher labor costs per bed size. 
What is most striking across the two papers, however, is the consistent 
results on differences in profitability across organizational form in hos- 
pitals and nursing homes. GP find that for-profits have statistically sig- 
nificant higher net income, return on assets, return on fixed assets, and 
operating margins than not-for-profits. Philipson, meanwhile, finds in 
regressions of price on measures of what might be termed quality plus an 
organizational form dummy, that prices charged by for-profits are at least 
as high as, if not higher than, those charged by not-for-profits. Moreover, 
this is true even though for-profits have lower labor costs, something that 
is also true in GP's  hospital results. Since, as Philipson notes, labor costs 
are by  far the biggest cost of production in nursing homes, these results 
imply that for-profit nursing homes are more profitable than not-for-profit 
nursing homes. 
These profitability results are at least consistent with the hypothesis that 
for-profits in health care are able to take advantage of  managerial efi- 
ciency to increase profits. Further research is needed to confirm the results 348  Comment on Chapters 9 and 10 
of  these papers (particularly using data from other years) and to study 
explicitly whether managerial efficiency is the reason behind the profit- 
ability of  for-profit hospitals and nursing homes. Moreover, further re- 
search into the mechanisms by which for-profits achieve this profitability 
should be a priority. 
Both papers do provide evidence that should be taken as a starting point 
for further research. It appears that for-profits are able to achieve higher 
profitability by adjusting both along the output price and input cost mar- 
gins in ways that go beyond keeping labor costs down. GP provide evi- 
dence that for-profit hospitals have consistently lower lengths of stay for 
all types of patients (which leads to lower input costs), yet they report that 
their case-mix index is higher than not-for-profits.  The lower length of stay 
result suggests that for-profit hospitals are successful in reducing input 
costs per patient, while the case-mix result may imply that for-profits are 
better able to “game” the insurance reimbursement system,’ which can be 
thought of as a way of adjusting along the output price margin. Philipson’s 
results, if taken at face value, show that for-profit nursing homes are able 
to adjust prices directly, charging more in many cases to private patients 
than not-for-profits.2 One has to wonder what the implications of these 
results are for patient welfare in particular, and social welfare in general. 
The Behavioral Response Problem in Computing 
Tax Benefits of Not-for-Profit Status 
GP should be applauded for their attention to detail in considering the 
many facets of the tax status of not-for-profit versus for-profit hospitals, 
and in attempting to carefully estimate the dollar magnitude of  the tax 
benefits of not-for-profit status. This was no small task. As GP  note, how- 
ever, almost all of  their estimates are based on the assumption that there 
would be no behavioral responses to the elimination of the tax benefits for 
not-for-profit hospitals. The authors do consider many possible ways in 
which not-for-profit hospitals might respond to losing their tax-exempt 
status, and conclude the paper by suggesting that the trend toward hospi- 
tal conversions to for-profit status may provide evidence on the magni- 
tudes of behavioral responses. This seems overly optimistic, unfortunately, 
for two reasons. 
First, there is ample evidence that for-profits make strategic decisions 
about where to locate (e.g., Norton and Staiger 1994). This should be the 
case if indeed they are acting as profit maximizers, and hospital conver- 
sions should occur for strategic reasons as well. If hospital conversions 
occur nonrandomly, trying to infer behavioral responses of comprehensive 
1. For evidence of how and why this might happen, see McClellan (1997). 
2.  How for-profit nursing homes are able to do this is not clear, and I return  to this 
point below. Comment on Chapters 9 and 10  349 
tax reform from longitudinal changes in the behavior of converted hospi- 
tals may be very misleading. If one cannot control for all of  the factors 
that lead a hospital to convert, one will  not get an accurate picture of 
behavioral responses to tax-exemption status. 
Second, the behavioral response of hospitals to a global change in tax 
policy may be very different from the behavioral response of a given not- 
for-profit hospital when it converts to for-profit status. A change in tax 
policy would affect every not-for-profit hospital in a given market (albeit 
not uniformly, obviously), while a change in the tax status of one hospital 
via conversion affects other hospitals only indirectly through market com- 
petition. There is no reason to believe that the behavioral responses of hos- 
pitals to these two very different changes to the structure of market com- 
petition will be comparable. 
In the end, then, one is confronted with the fact that actually estimating 
the behavioral responses to changes in the tax exemption status of hospi- 
tals is a formidable task. Given the complexity involved in modeling the 
market structure of hospitals, it may well be that estimating such a behav- 
ioral response will require some sort of fortuitous “natural experiment”- 
type policy change. 
Do For-Profit Nursing Homes Really Charge Higher Prices? 
Philipson provides evidence from hedonic regressions that the agency 
justification for not-for-profit status does not hold up empirically in his 
data. Indeed, for many specifications, for-profit nursing homes actually 
charge statistically significant higher prices than not-for-profits,  even con- 
ditional on the other observable characteristics of nursing homes in his 
data. The economic differences in prices are also substantial: The esti- 
mates range from a 6 percent price premium to a 27 percent price pre- 
mium in 1985, although the estimates are smaller and not always signifi- 
cant in 1995. 
One is left to wonder, then, how it is that for-profit nursing homes are 
able to charge a premium over not-for-profits. One possibility is simply 
that this is an artifact of the data. In particular, the quality measures that 
the National Nursing Home Survey contains are somewhat crude as they 
measure formal services provided by  the nursing homes. Indeed, adding 
the quality variables into the regression does not change the R2’s  much, so 
these quality variables (the coefficients of which are not reported) do not 
explain much of the variation in nursing home prices. It may well be that 
consumers (either nursing home patients or their families) also value 
highly many less formal services provided by the nursing homes, services 
that are harder to measure in a survey filled out by nursing home adminis- 
trators but that may well be correlated with the organizational status of 
the nursing home. In particular, a for-profit nursing home will specialize 
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so allows it to provide a differentiated “product” for which consumers are 
willing to pay a premium and for which profits are increased. 
Another possibility for the finding that for-profit nursing home prices 
are higher is that consumers do not have full information about price and 
quality when choosing a nursing home for themselves or a family member. 
Given the circumstances under which such choices are made, this may 
well be the case. This is, of course, exactly the type of agency problem that 
is used to justify the existence of not-for-profits, because while not-for- 
profit nursing homes may not have an incentive to exploit this information 
asymmetry, for-profit nursing homes will want to take advantage of con- 
sumers’ lack of information. While Philipson argues that this problem 
should lead consumers to use not-for-profit organizational form as a sig- 
nal of the nonexploitation of consumers, there may be other signals that 
consumers infer from organizational form (such as managerial efficiency 
or interest in complying with the demands of longer-term residents). 
The data set used in this paper will not be enough to get to the bottom 
of the puzzle of why or whether for-profits are able to charge a premium 
for long-term care. Patient satisfaction surveys, more attention to the pro- 
cess by which nursing homes are chosen, and more detailed surveys of the 
services (formal and informal) provided by nursing homes are needed, all 
in combination with good price data. 
Conclusion 
Both the paper by  GP and the paper by  Philipson provide food for 
thought about a variety of topics. While the papers set out to examine 
very different aspects of not-for-profit health care and look at different 
types of  care (short-term hospitals versus long-term nursing homes) for 
different populations, they find consistent patterns along a number of di- 
mensions. The most interesting of these is the finding that for-profits are 
consistently more profitable than not-for-profits.  Assuming this empirical 
result holds up upon further examination, it has the potential to have large 
implications for patient and consumer welfare, implications that should 
be considered in future research. This is particularly important as these 
markets rapidly evolve in response to changes in the structure of health 
insurance, changes in federal and local policy toward the provision of 
health care, and the aging of the population. 
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Comment on Chapter 10  William B. Vogt 
In his chapter, “Asymmetric Information and the Not-for-Profit Sector: 
Does Its Output Sell at a Premium?” Tom Philipson estimates a hedonic 
price function in order to assess the degree to which not-for-profit (NFP) 
nursing homes provide higher quality care than do for-profit (FP) nursing 
homes.’ He motivates this empirical project by  noticing that the substan- 
tial representation of not-for-profit firms in the production of health ser- 
vices is normally explained by recourse to (often implicit) agency models. 
The idea is that not-for-profits have different objectives than do their for- 
profit counterparts. Perhaps they value not only profit but also the delivery 
of high-quality goods. These preferences may cause them to deliver high- 
quality goods in circumstances where for-profit firms would choose to 
deliver low-quality goods. Not-for-profits do not cheat on (unobserved) 
quality because they do not want to cheat. 
The paper reasons that, if not-for-profits do, indeed, deliver higher qual- 
ity  care than  do for-profits, then consumers, recognizing this, will  be 
willing to pay higher prices for the not-for-profits’ services. This greater 
willingness to pay should show up in data as a higher selling price for not- 
for-profits’ services. 
The paper’s empirical implementation consists of a hedonic price re- 
gression performed on data for a sample of nursing homes in the United 
States in the years 1985 and 1995. Price is regressed on a large array of ob- 
servable characteristics, including prices paid by public payers, scale, input 
use, and quality indicators. The results indicate that, unconditionally, not- 
for-profits receive higher prices than do for-profits. However, when  the 
array of control variables is entered into the regression, this result either 
disappears or reverses itself The paper concludes that, in 1995, there was 
no difference in willingness to pay, and in 1985, there appears to be higher 
willingness to pay for for-profit firms. 
This paper represents an interesting attack on a problem that has seen 
too little serious empirical investigation. The question it addresses is pro- 
vocative and timely, the methodology employed is thought provoking, and 
the results of the analysis are fascinating. In my  comments, I would like, 
first, to examine in a little more detail the assumptions undergirding the 
analysis, and, second, to suggest that the results admit alternative  explana- 
tions. 
Although the paper does mention many of the assumptions that lie be- 
hind this type of exercise, I think it is worth emphasizing again what as- 
sumptions ensure that a regression of this kind produces results interpret- 
William B. Vogt is assistant professor of economics  and public policy at the H. John Heinz 
1. I confine my comments to this paper because my knowledge of public finance is limited 
I11 School of Public Policy and Management, Carnegie Mellon University. 
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able as willingness-to-pay measures. For the sake of  explicitness, let US 
examine a utility function for long-term care (LTC) services. Suppose con- 
sumers make a discrete decision about the firm at which to consume LTC 
and that, after this, the utility of the choice is revealed to them: 
u,(x1,,x,,,x3,,NFP,,I  - P,) = 
Pl’iXi,  + Pl\X2, + Pt’3X3,  + PtNFPNFP,  +  a(Z - PI). 
Here U, is the utility to consumer i of going to firmj; XI, are the character- 
istics of firm J  observable to consumers and the econometrician; X2, are 
the characteristics of firm  j observable to consumers but not the econome- 
trician; X3, are the characteristics of firm j observable to neither; NFP is 
an indicator variable for NFP status; p, is firm j’s price, I, is consumer i’s 
income, and p, represent the weights assigned to various characteristics by 
consumer i. Since consumers cannot see X,, they form expectations over 
them, so that their behavioral utility function will be: 
U,(~,,J,,,NFP,,I - P,) = 
p,\Xi,  P,\X2,  pj’3E(X3,1x,,x2,  9 NFP) 4-  P,ivmNFP,  I - P,  )* 
This can be inverted to produce, for consumer i, prices that keep him 
indifferent between firms. I drop both Z and the level of utility since they 
are unimportant for our purposes. 
P  ;w1,  > x,,  ,  NFP, 1 = 
1 
a, 
-@!’lXi,  + PziX2,  + Bt’.3E[x3,1X1,x2,  9  NFP1  + PtNFPNFP,). 
Price is superscripted by  D to show that it is a relationship that creates 
indifference for consumer i on the demand side (as opposed to being an 
equilibrium relationship between price and characteristics).  The object the 
paper is interested in is 
1 
-PtXE[X3,1X,,X2,, NFP  =  11 - E[X3,IXl,X2,  ,  NFP  =  01). 
a, 
The empirical strategy is to run the following regression: 
pj =  yt!lXlj  +  yNFPNFPj  +  cj. 
The coefficient  yNFp  is then (in essence) interpreted as: 
1 
-  PA( E[X3jlXljXzj,  NFP  =  I] - E[X3,1XljX2j,  NFP  =  01). 
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The identification of yNFp  with the underlying structural information relies 
on three conditions being true: 
1.  That the equilibrium price relationship, p*(X,,  X2),  reveals the in- 
difference curves of consumers; 
2.  That (l/aj)  Pzk (E[X3jX,jX2j,  NFP = 11 -  E[X,IX,X,,  NFP = 01)  is 
a constant; and 
3. That the omission of X, creates no bias. 
The first condition is required if the regression is to be interpreted as re- 
vealing demand information. The second and third conditions are re- 
quired for the regression to be properly specified. 
The first condition, that a hedonic price function reveals demand infor- 
mation, is known to be true ifi2 
1. There is perfect competition. 
2. There is no heterogeneity among consumers. 
3. All observed firms are in the same market. 
These are strong assumptions in any case, and they are particularly strong 
here. Since the sample is drawn from the United States as a whole, the 
third assumption amounts to assuming that nursing home services are 
sold on a national market. The paper deals with this in the best way these 
data allow, by  analyzing separate regions separately. As to the second as- 
sumption, the paper notes that if (hi)  p3j  is constant across consumers, 
then the hedonic price function identifies demand information for this 
characteristic. 
As to the first assumption, this is problematic for two reasons. First, as 
I mentioned above, these products are geographically differentiated, and 
since it is reasonable to believe that consumers have relatively strong pref- 
erences over their residential location, the firms in the sample are likely to 
have some market power owing to this differentiation. Second, and as the 
paper notes, CON laws limit both entry and capacity expansion in this 
industry. This, combined with the fact that nursing homes have very high 
capacity utilization and the anecdotes of  waiting lists for some homes, 
should give us pause in assuming the costless spot market that is part of 
perfect competition. 
The second condition requires two assumptions. First, that pimp = 0 
and that E(X3jlX,jX2,3  NFP) be linear in NFPs. The third condition con- 
tains, again, the assumption that geographic and other unmeasured dif- 
ferentiation are not important in these markets. It is, in general, very diffi- 
cult to “sign” the bias that the failure of any of these assumptions might 
2. Here, I am assuming that there is a single market for nursing home services and that 
the stochastic element in the statistical model arises exclusively from measurement error in 
prices. For discussion, see Rosen (1974). For discussion in a multimarket context with richer 
stochastic specification than I consider, see Epple (1987). 354  Comment on Chapter 10 
Table 10C.l  NFP Premium and Control Variables 
None  Cost  Cost, Quality 
Year  v4  (YO)  (”/I 
1985  +9  -3  -6 
1995  +  10  2  -17 
cause, and sorting out which of these assumptions is true and what impli- 
cations for the interpretation of the results any failures have must wait for 
future work, probably with different data. 
Before passing on to an alternative interpretation of these results, I’d 
like to expand a bit on what the results say. In table 10C.l, I reproduce the 
results from the sample means and from the regression analysis, expressed 
as the NFP price premium for skilled care. The columns in the table corre- 
spond to unconditional means, specification 1 from the paper (“public 
price”), and specification  4 from the paper (“quality”). I have interpreted 
the public price variables as cost controls, since in many states (at least in 
1985) Medicaid paid on a “cost plus” basis. 
What the results say is that, in the raw  data, NFPs enjoy a 9 or 10 
percent price premium. Once costs are controlled, NFPs have a much 
smaller (or negative) premium, and once cost and quality are controlled, 
NFPs have a negative premium. The paper, since it tells a demand-side 
story, is either interpreting the cost controls as proxies for X, or as controls 
for the fact that the market is defined too broadly. 
In addition, there are some other facts in the unconditional means that 
bear comment. Assuming that public price is a cost proxy, NFPs in both 
1995 and 1985 have higher costs than do FPs. Furthermore, using input 
levels and the indicators reported as quality measures, NFPs provide, in 
general, higher quality care. (This is consistent with other work on nursing 
homes; see Gertler and Waldman 1992, for example.) 
I will now spin a story that rationalizes these results, using the “NFPs 
are different”  conventional wisdom. My point is not that this story is more 
correct than the one the paper spins, but that the data and mode of analy- 
sis at hand do not distinguish between them. 
Consider the pricing equation of an FP firm in an imperfectly competi- 
tive market:3 
3. It is easiest to think of this as a model of monopolistic competition. For an interpreta- 
tion as an oligopolistic model, consider the demand to be residual demand, after solving out 
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Here, MC are marginal costs, D is the demand curve, and q is the quality 
of the good produced. 
An NFP with conventional preferences (“profit deviating” in the lan- 
guage of Philipson and Lakdawalla 1997; see also Newhouse 1970) has a 
utility function 
U  =  IT  +  A,Q +  A,q, 
where IT  are profits, Q is output, and q is quality. Its pricing equation is: 
A, - 
In discussing these two pricing equations, I’ll proceed intuitively; how- 
ever, it is not very difficult to write down a formal model rationalizing the 
intuition. Since the NFP has a preference for quality, per se, it is likely 
that it will choose a higher quality. (This is most obvious when quality is 
unobservable, when FPs will  choose the lowest feasible level.) Consider 
now whether the NFP will price higher or lower than does the FF? The 
preference for output, A,, tends to decrease price; whereas the higher qual- 
ity raises marginal costs and likely also raises the third, “market power,” 
term, tending to increase price. So, the effect of NFP preferences on price 
is indeterminate. 
When costs are controlled, NFPs will appear to have a smaller price 
premium than they do when costs are not controlled (since they have 
higher costs). Removing MC from the FP  and NFP equations above leads 
to FPs’ prices increasing relative to NFPs’ prices. If we  think of the resid- 
ual covariation in price and quality remaining after costs are controlled as 
arising from the market power term, then controlling for quality should 
cause NFPs’ prices to fall further, relative to FPs’ prices. In fact, once MC 
and market power are gone from the pricing equation, all that is left to 
differentiate the two is A,. Thus, with cost and quality controlled for, NFPs 
should have a lower price than do FPs, because of their preference for 
So, a model in which NFP nursing homes are imperfect competitors 
with profit-deviating preferences appears to produce predictions conso- 
nant with the results found in the paper and reported in table 10C.l and 
its accompanying text. What is at issue here is whether the regression re- 
ported in the paper identifies demand-side behavior, supply-side  behavior, 
or some mixture. The story I tell above relaxes assumption 1 (perfect com- 
petition). With an imperfectly competitive market, price is a choice vari- 
output.4 
4. Obviously, all of this discussion proceeds as if the right-hand-side variables are exoge- 
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able of firms, they have some scope in setting it, and their objectives and 
costs appear in their choices (thus in prices). 
“Asymmetric Information and the Not-for-Profit Sector: Does Its Out- 
put Sell at a Premium?” opens an important discussion of the strategies 
one might employ in evaluating empirically the validity of theories of not- 
for-profit behavior. The potential gains to the careful application of eco- 
nomic theory to a critical appraisal of agency and profit-deviating theories 
of not-for-profit behavior are large and, although this paper does not pro- 
duce conclusive results on the matter, it is valuable in that it establishes a 
reference point for future investigation and helps to set the agenda for 
future work. 
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